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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State of Idaho appeals from the district court's order reducing Mr. Hartzell's 
felony stalking charge to a misdemeanor. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In October of 2011, Mr. Hartzell was charged with felony stalking, I.C. § 18-7905, 
based upon a civil protection order1 put in place by a Washington court. (R., pp.18-1 9.) 
Mr. Hartzell filed a Motion in Limine seeking to exclude from introduction at trial all 
testimony and evidence regarding the Washington issued protection order. (R., pp.95-
96.) At the hearing on the motion in limine, Mr. Hartzell presented eleven statements of 
fact that had been stipulated to by both parties. 2 (Tr., p.11, L.17- p.12, L.17.) These 
stipulated facts included that the protection order from Asotin County, Washington, was 
not based on any allegation of domestic violence and the protected party, Cathlin 
Berreth, and Mr. Hartzell were not in a domestic relationship. (Tr., p.11, L.17 - p.12, 
L.13, p. 35, Ls.4-7; R., p.11 0.) Mr. Hartzell, through his counsel, argued that the 
1 The order is actually entitled, "Order for Protection- Harassment." (Exhibit A) 
2 (1) Ms. Berreth did not have a dating relationship with Mr. Hartzell; (2) Mr. Hartzell is 
not Ms. Berreth's spouse or former spouse; (3) Mr. Hartzell is not related to Ms. Berreth; 
(4) Mr. Hartzell and Ms. Berreth have never lived together; (5) Mr. Hartzell and 
Ms. Berreth do not have any children in common; (6) Mr. Hartzell never physically 
injured Ms. Berreth nor did he ever threaten to; (7) Mr. Hartzell never sexually abused 
Ms. Berreth nor threaten to do so; (8) Mr. Hartzell never forcefully imprisoned 
Ms. Berreth nor threaten to do so; (9) Ms. Berreth did not allege to the judge who issued 
the protection order that any of the above was true; (1 0) Ms. Berreth never alleged 
domestic violence; and (11) neither domestic violence nor any of the above mentioned 
items constituted the basis for the Washington protection order. (Tr., p.11, L.17- p.12, 
L.14.) 
1 
Washington protection order was not relevant because the Washington protection order 
was not issued under similar provisions to Idaho Code§ 39-6306. (Tr., p.13, Ls.12-23.) 
The district court granted Mr. Hartzell's motion in limine and ordered the 
exclusion of the Washington order of protection, finding that it was not a protection order 
as defined by I.C. § 39-6303 as it was not one issued pursuant to a provision of 
Washington law similar to I.C. § 39-6306. (Tr., p.36, Ls.?-15.) The district court noted 
that the situation in Mr. Hartzell's case was not one that could have made the basis for a 
protection order under I.C. § 39-6306. (Tr., p.35, Ls.19-21.) Further, the State 
stipulated to, and the district court found, that the Washington protection order was not 
one that could have been obtained in ldaho. 3 (Tr., p.35, Ls.16-19.) The district court 
found that the protection order contained only information that Mr. Hartzell committed 
unlawful harassment as defined by Washington law. (Tr., p.35, Ls.11-14.) 
The district court found that the Washington State statute under which the Asotin 
County protection order was obtained was not analogous to I.C. § 39-6306, Idaho's 
domestic violence protection order statute. (Tr., p.35, Ls.19-21.) The district court 
examined the definition of "protection order", finding it is a term defined by Idaho statute, 
I.C. § 39-6303(8). (Tr., p.34, Ls.16-18.) The district court noted that a "protection order" 
is defined as an order issued in another jurisdiction pursuant to a provision similar to 
l.C. § 39-6306. (Tr., p.34, Ls.17-21.) 
3 The Washington protection order was obtained pursuant to Revised Code of 
Washington§ 10.14.080, which allows a petitioner to seek a civil protection order upon 
an allegation of harassment, without regard to the relationship between the parties to 
the petition and without any allegation of domestic violence. RCW § 1 0.14.080. Idaho 
does not have a similar or equivalent statute; in Idaho, a civil protection order may only 
be obtained upon a showing that there is an immediate and present danger of domestic 
violence which requires that the parties to have been either family or household 
members or in a dating relationship. (I. C. §§ 39-6303, 39-6306; R., p.1 09.) 
2 
The district court reduced the charge to a misdemeanor, over the objection of the 
prosecutor. (R., p.111.) Thereafter, the State appealed the district court's order 
reducing the charge to a misdemeanor. (R., pp.117 -119.) 
3 
Has the State failed to show error on the part of the district court in finding that 
Mr. Hartzell's stalking charge could not be enhanced due to the presence of the out-of-
state, non-domestic, order for protection?4 
4 Although the state repeatedly (See Appellant's Brief, pp.1-3) incorrectly refers to the 
protection order as a "no contact order", the differences between a civil protection order 
and a no contact order are significant. (See, e.g., the Ada County Guide to Protection 




The State Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Reducing 
Mr. Hartzell's Stalking Charge To A Misdemeanor 
A. Introduction 
The district court correctly found that the VVashington-issued protective order was 
not a protective order as defined under Idaho law and could not be used to enhance the 
stalking charge to a felony. 5 The district court granted Mr. Hartzell's motion in limine 
and reduced the felony stalking charge to a misdemeanor. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." I.R. 401; State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 597, 
603 (Ct. App. 1 998). Whether evidence is relevant is an issue of law. State v. Atkinson, 
124 Idaho 816, 819 (Ct. App. 1 993). This Idaho Supreme Court's standard of review on 
issues of relevance is de novo. State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214 (2000). 
In addition, this Court reviews the application and construction of statutes de 
novo. State v. Ephraim, 152 Idaho 176, 177 (Ct. App. 2011 ). In doing so, this Court is 
obligated to give effect to every word and phrase within the statute, to avoid a 
construction that would render any portion of the statute a nullity, and to further avoid 
treating any of the terms within the statute as mere surplusage. See, e.g., Bradbury v. 
5 To rule otherwise would treat out-of-state residents differently than in-state residents, 
including violation of the right to travel derived from Article IV, § 2 of the United States 
Constitution and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and such would also violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 
U.S. 489 (1999). 
5 
Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116 (2009); Ephraim, 152 Idaho at 177; State v. 
Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a statute is plain 
and unambiguous, the Appellate Court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462 (1 999); State v. 
Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1 999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389 (Ct. App. 
2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational 
mean111g. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659. If the language is clear and unambiguous, the 
Appellate Court does not need to look to legislative history or rules of statutory 
interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389. "A statute is ambiguous where the language 
is capable of more than one reasonable construction." Verska v. St. Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896 (2011) (quoting Porter v. Board of 
Trustees, Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, ·14 (2004)). An unambiguous 
statute would have only one reasonable interpretation; an alternative interpretation that 
is unreasonable would not make the statute ambiguous. Verska, 151 Idaho at 896. 
C. The District Court Correctly Found That The Washington Protection Order Could 
Not Form The Basis To Elevate The Charge To Felony First Degree Stalking 
1. I.C. §§ 18-7905 and 39-6303 Are Not Ambiguous 
The well-established standards for statutory construction are: 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court 
must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory 
construction. The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, 
and rational meaning. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is 
no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory 
interpretation. When the court must engage in statutory construction, it 
has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. 
To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of 
the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public 
policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. It is incumbent upon 
6 
the court to give a statute an interpretation that will not render it a nullity. 
VVhere ambiguity exists as to the elements of a crime, this Court will 
strictly construe the criminal statute in favor of the defendant. 
State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641. 646, P.3d 116, 121 (2001) (citations and internal 
quotations omitted). 
By using that particular language, the Legislature inherently limited the types of 
orders that could be used to elevate a misdemeanor stalking to a felony under this code 
section because "[i]t is a universally recognized rule of the construction that, where a 
constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes 
all others."' See, e.g., Local 1494 of lnt'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Gauer d'Alene, 
99 Idaho 630, 639-40 (1978) (quoting Peck v. State, 63 Idaho 375 (1941 )). Therefore, if 
the term at issue does not properly conform to the requirements listed in the statute, it is 
excluded from the scope of the statute. Specifically at issue here is whether any 
document entitled a "protection order" is included in I.C. § 18-7905 or whether the 
reader must utilize the definitions of "protection order" as set forth by the Idaho 
legislature in I.C. § 39-6303(8) to analyze whether the protection order meets the 
definition contained in the statute. Terms in a statute are given their commonly 
understood definitions, and if a statute is unambiguous, the courts must give effect to 
the unambiguous language of the statute. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011 ). 
Here, the term "protection order" is defined by statute. I.C. § 39-6306(8). 
Further, the definition of "protection order" also includes what qualifies as a protection 
order in Idaho when the protection order is obtained in another jwrisdiction. I.C. § 39-
6306(8)(b). The state is asking this Court to disregard the legislature's definition of 
7 
"protection order" when determining whether the Washington state protection order 
serves to enhance the stalking charge to a felony under I.C. § 18-7905. The legislature 
defined what qualified as a "protection order" in Idaho: 
"Protection order" means any order issued for the purpose of preventing 
violent or threatening acts or acts of harassment against, or contact or 
communication with, or physical proximity to, another person, where the 
order was issued: 
(b) In another jurisdiction pursuant to a provision similar to section 39-
6306, Idaho Code. 
I.C. § 39-6303(8)(b). 
Notably, when drafting I.C. § 18-7905(a) the legislature did not utilize a "catch-all" 
phrase such as " ... or any substantially conforming court order including those from 
foreign jurisdictions", or similar language which would indicate that the legislature 
intended to include all court orders from other jurisdictions for which the general intent 
or purpose was to prohibit communications or contact between persons. But the 
legislature did choose to utilize similar language when drafting the same statute to 
describe the crimes for which a defendant's conviction could serve to enhance the 
second degree stalking to a felony first degree stalking, so it clearly realized it could 
broaden the means by which a second degree stalking charge could be enhanced to a 
first degree stalking charge. See I. C.§ 18-7905(1 )(f). 6 
61.C. § 18-7905(1 )(f) provides: 
A person commits the crime of stalking in the first degree if the person 
violates section 18-7906, Idaho Code, and: 
The defendant has been previously convicted of a crime, or an attempt, 
solicitation or conspiracy to commit a crime, involving the same victim as 
the previous offense under any of the following provisions of Idaho Code 
or a substantially conforming foreign criminal violation within seven (7) 
years ... (emphasis added) 
8 
Thus, because that language of a statute must be given its "plain, obvious, and 
rational meaning," the only way to read the felony stalking statute provision for a 
"protection order" is to ascertain what the state is required to prove in order to convict 
the Mr. Hartzell of felony stalking based on the existence of an out of state protection 
order. 
The district court correctly determined that the Washington state statute under 
which the Asotin County protection order was obtained was not analogous to I.C. § 39-
6306, Idaho's domestic violence protection order statute, and the only statute under 
which a civil protection order can be obtained in Idaho. (Tr., p.35, Ls.19-21.) Further, 
the state conceded that the order from Asotin County, Washington, was an "order of 
protection-harassment," and could not have even been obtained in the State of Idaho. 
The state also conceded that the petitioner in the Washington case would not have 
qualified for a protection order or no contact order in the state of Idaho. (Tr., p.35, 
Ls.22-24.) 
2. Alternatively, To The Extent There Is An Ambiguity Within The Felony 
Stalking Statute, Pursuant To The Rule Of Lenity, It Must Be Interpreted In 
Favor Of Mr. Hartzell 
The United States Supreme Court spoke to the cannons for interpreting an 
ambiguous statute in State v. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152 (1990). The Court stated: 
In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the 
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole 
and its object and policy. Moreover, because the governing standard is 
set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in 
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the 
extent that the language or history is uncertain, this 'time-honored 
interpretive guideline' serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of 
the boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not courts, define 
criminal liability. 
9 
!d. at 1 oo~1-1 002.) "It is well-settled that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly 
and in favor of the defendant." State v. McCoy, 1 Idaho 362, 365 ('1996). 
"[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of 
lenity." United States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Rewis v. 
United States, 401 U 808, 811 (1971 )). Accordingly, Mr. Hartzell asserts that if it is 
not clear whether or not the legislature intended to exclude foreign protection orders 
that were not domestic in nature and which did not comport with the requirement of 
LC. § 39-6306, this Court should read this statute in favor of Mr. Hartzell. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hartzell respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the district 
court. 
DATED this gth day of January, 2013. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
10 
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